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CASE NOTES
equitable servitudes on personalty. One enforced an equitable servitude
upon a juke box." The second allowed a promissor, who had agreed upon
the purchase of damaged goods that they should not be sold in their original
container, to enforce this agreement against a later purchaser, who took
with knowledge of plaintiff's promise and of a similar promise to plaintiff
by the person from whom the defendant purchased.42 This case, as do most
cases where equitable servitudes are enforced, involved elements of unfair
competition, tortious interference with contractual and business relations,
and, importantly, a consideration of public welfare."
As already mentioned, the practice which Independent sought to pro-
tect by injunctive relief was given judicial approval in 1936.51 Since then, at
least one court has found conduct such as defendant's improperly offensive
to a magazine distributor's carefully developed merchandising system,52
while several defendants have allowed consent decrees to be entered against
them.53 It is submitted that in a situation like the present, where there are
considerations of public policy favoring the enforcement of the restriction
as a proper business practice, as well as considerations favoring the un-
restricted mobility of chattels, much good might come from a thorough re-
examination of the doctrine of equitable servitudes on chattels. It might
provide a practical and proper remedy; it might be more beneficial to the
public than an indiscriminate application of UCC 2-403(2); or, in Chafee's
terms, the game might be found to be "worth the candle."
JOHN M. CALLAHAN
Trade Regulations—Clayton Act Section 3—Tie-In Sales—Proper Busi-
ness Reason.—Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith CorP.1—A. 0.
Smith is a national manufacturer of storage equipment. It manufactures
a patented glass lined silo and a patented unloading device designed for
use with its silo. From 1951 through 1957 it sold its unloaders separately
on request. During this period it sold eighty unloaders to thirty-six
customers which were used with silos other than those of the defendant's
manufacture. It received complaints from eighteen of these customers and
six unloaders were returned for refund. In 1958, as a result of the volume
of complaints, the defendant adopted a policy of selling its unloaders only
for use in simultaneously purchased or previously acquired silos of its own
48 Pratte v. Balatsos, supra note 44. In a notable comment upon this case, Chafee
failed to give it his wholehearted approval. He was skeptical of the wisdom, on grounds
of public policy, of tying a juke box to a business. Id.
43 Nadal & Co. v. Grasso, supra note 44.
50 See extensive note in 48 Calif. L. Rev. 337 (1960). Also noted in 74 Harv. L.
Rev. 612 (1961). Albrecht, 1 B.C. Ind. and Com. L. Rev. 215, 216 (1960), suggested:
In view of the interest of the public in permitting the unrestricted transfer
of chattels, it would seem better to grant such power (that of enforcing re-
strictive covenants by injunction) only to the manufacturer.
51 Supra note 17.
52 Supra note 12.
53 Supra note 16.
1 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 82 S. Ct. 368 (1961).
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design and manufacture. The plaintiff, a manufacturer of fish products, at-
tempted to purchase four of the defendant's unloaders for use in watertight
tanks not made by the defendant which could alternatively be used without
the unloaders for storage of liquid products. In accordance with its policy,
the defendant refused to sell the unloaders separately. Subsequently, the
plaintiff purchased four of the unloaders with silos which could only be
used for storage of granular fish meal products. Thereafter the plaintiff
suspended its manufacture of fish meal and increased its homogenized liquid
fish business. The plaintiff brought suit for treble damages under Section 4
of the Clayton Act2 alleging that the sale of the unloaders and silos as a unit
was a tie-in sale violative of section 3 of the act3 and damaged the plaintiff.'
The District Court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
On appeal, affirmed. HELD • A proper business reason may justify what might
otherwise be an unlawful tie-in sale. It was reasonable for the defendant
to protect its reputation by conditioning the sale of its unloaders on their
use in silos meeting the specifications that experience showed were required.
Furthermore the plaintiff did not sustain the burden of proving damages. It
failed to show that the defendant's price for the silos was unreasonable or that
equivalent silos meeting the defendant's specifications (which the court
found to be reasonable) could have been purchased at a lower price.
A tie-in exists whenever the vendor or lessor of a product conditions the
sale or lease of such product on the purchase or lease of another product.°
The former product is the tying product and the latter is called the tied
product. Such arrangements are proscribed by Section 3 of the Clayton Act
whenever the effect thereof "may be to substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."° It was this quoted
2 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods ... whether
patented or unpatented . .. on the condition, agreement, or understanding that
the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods ... of a com-
petitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease,
sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may
be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce.
38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958). Plaintiff also urged a violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act. "Every contract . . . in restraint of trade or commerce . . is
hereby declared to be illegal...." 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
4 The plaintiff alleged that (1) the defendant's silos were more expensive than
the tanks it initially desired to purchase for use with defendant's unloaders; (2) as a
result of having to purchase defendant's silos, an installation delay ensued which
would not have occurred had the watertight tanks been used; and (3) as a result of
the purchase of defendant's silos, it lost the alternative liquid storage which it would
have had if the watertight tanks had been installed.
5 Northern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1957). For a general
discussion of tie-in agreements see Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage
Problem, 67 Yale L.J. 19 (1957); Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements under
the Antitrust Laws, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 50 (1958); Tying Restrictions: Changing Standards
of Legality, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 733; Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic
Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the
Clayton Act, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 913 (1952).
6 Supra note 3.
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clause that had created some confusion in the past as to what types of tie-in
arrangements were illegal under the Clayton Act.
In International Salt Co. v. United States,7 the rule was stated that
where the tying product is patented, such an arrangement will be per se
violative of Section 3 of the Clayton Act so long as a "not insubstantial
amount of commerce is affected." A patent merely establishes prima
facie the dominant position of the vendor in the market for the tying
product,8 a condition which must be shown to exist in the non-patent cases
in order that there be a violation.
The Times-Picayune decision° set out the distinction in the tests for
determining violations of Section 3 of the Clayton Act and Section 1 of
the Sherman Act:
From the tying cases a perceptible pattern of illegality emerges:
When the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for
the "tying" product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the
"tied" product is restrained, a tying arrangement violates the
narrower standards expressed in § 3 of the Clayton Act because
from either factor the requisite potential lessening of competition is
inferred. And because for even a lawful monopolist it is "un-
reasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial
market," a tying arrangement is banned by § 1 of the Sherman Act
whenever both conditions are met."
The Northern Pacific case" made the test less stringent:
While there is some language in the Times-Picayune opinion which
speaks of "monopoly power" or "dominance" over the tying
product as a necessary precondition for application of the rule of
per se unreasonableness to tying arangements, we do not construe
this general language as requiring anything more than sufficient
economic power to impose an appreciable restraint on free com-
petition in the tied product (assuming all the time, of course, that
a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce is affected).
• . . [T]he vice of tying arrangements lies in the use of economic
power in one market to restrict competition on the merits in an-
other, regardless of the source from which the power is derived and
whether the power takes the form of monopoly or not.12
7 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
8 A patent . . . although in fact there may be many competing substitutes
for the patented article, is at least prima facie evidence of [market] control.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 US. 293, 307 (1949). International Business
Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
9 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1952).
10 Id. at 608.
. . . Of course where the seller has no control or dominance over the tying
product so that it does not represent an effectual weapon to pressure buyers
into taking the tied item any restraint of trade attributable to such tying
arrangements would obviously be insignificant at most.
Northern Pacific R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
11 Supra note 10.
72 356 U.S. 1, 9 (1958).
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Jerold Electronics Corp. v. United States's decided in 1960, set out
an exception to the per se illegality rule. This exception had been suggested
in dicta in earlier cases,° but the fact situations in those cases were not
such as would fall within this "business justification" exception. Jerold
manufactured standard components for community television antenna
systems, some of which were patented. Although the systems were sold
as units, each had to be custom designed for the particular characteristics
of the community in which it would be installed. Jerold was the originator
of this new industry and manufactured and installed at least 75% of the
systems. The company refused to sell its components separately and
adopted a policy of selling only a complete antenna system with a tied-in
installation and service agreement.
It thus appeared in that case that the requirements for application of
the per se rule of illegality had been met. Jerold had tied non-patented
products to patented components and had further tied a service and instal-
lation policy to the sale of the antenna system.° But the court there
found no violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act during the period for
which justification or a proper business reason for the tie-in could be shown.
The court emphasized that the manufacture, installation and service of
community antenna systems was a new and technical industry with a highly
uncertain future and the majority of Jerold's business was devoted to such.
Jerold could not reasonably protect its reputation or good will nor could
satisfactory performance of a given system be assured unless it could
restrict the use of components to those of its own manufacture and could
restrict modifications in the systems to those of its own design and instal-
lation. Any tie-in of components would be justified as long as the service
13 187 F. Supp. 545 (ED. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (the
appeal only involved the period of time for which the defendant failed to show
justification).
14 Of course a lessor may impose on a lessee reasonable restrictions designed in
good faith to minimize maintenance burdens and to assume satisfactory opera-
tion.
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397 (1947).
The Clayton Act names no exception to its prohibition of monopolistic tying
clauses. Even if we are free to make an exception to its unambiguous command,
[citations] we can perceive no tenable basis for an exception in favor of a con-
dition whose substantial benefit to the lessor is the elimination of business com-
petition and the creation of monopoly, rather that the protection of its good
will, and where it does not appear that the latter can not be achieved by
methods which do not tend to monopoly and are not otherwise unlawful.
International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 140 (1936); see also
FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
15 Note that since Clayton Act II 3 does not include a sale of services, a
Sherman Act violation had to be proved. The court did say that the components
of the system could not normally be treated as separate products, but this was not
crucial to the result.
It is apparent that, as a general rule, a manufacturer cannot be forced to deal
in the minimum product that could be sold or is sold. On the other hand, it
is equally clear that one cannot circumvent the antitrust laws simply by claiming
that he is selling a single product. The facts must be examined to ascertain
whether or not there are legitimate reasons for selling normally separated items
in a combined form to dispel any inferences that it is really a disguised tie-in.
187 F. Supp. 545, 559 (1960).
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contracts were justifiable. But the court took notice of the fact that con-
ditions had changed with time as the industry and Jerold became more
firmly established and that Jerold failed to show a "sound business reason"
for its restrictive policy in the light of the changed conditions.m
The establishment of the "sound business reason" exception to the
rule of illegality under Section 3 of the Clayton Act in Jerold appears to
be a return to the "rule of reason" test which was involved in the early
cases construing the Sherman Act.'7 This approach has been suggested
in articles dealing with Section 3 of the Clayton Act."2 However, it was
rejected by the Supreme Court in the Standard Stations" case which set out
the test of "quantitative substantiality"—Has competition "been foreclosed
in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected"?2°
In the recent Tampa Electricn case, dealing with a requirements con-
tract under Section 3 of the Clayton Act (a closely related problem) the
Supreme Court recognized that "at least in the case of public utilities the
assurance of a steady and ample supply of fuel is necessary in the public
interest."22 Such a consideration of the public interest is in effect a "back
door" approach to the "rule of reason" condemned by Standard Stations.23
76 The defendants have the burden not only of establishing the initial
existence of the facts necessary to support their claim but also their continuing
existence in view of the fact that it is not disputed that the conditions did
change ....
Id. at 560.
17 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), Chicago Board of Trade
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). See also FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261
U.S. 463 (1923), which seems to suggest a similar approach under the Clayton Act.
76 If there is some basis for the tying arrangement other than market control
or a legal monopoly, the supplier charged with a Section 3 violation should
have no difficulty proving that basis. In the absence of such a showing, it
would seem appropriate to apply the International Sall [per se] test simply
upon proof that tying arrangements have been used covering a substantial
amount of commerce in the tied product. . . . Absent proof that particular
tying arrangements are based on economic advantage to the buyers unrelated
to the supplier's market control, it is probable that they are based on market
control, and if based on market control, that they will probably substantially
lessen competition in the tied product if a substantial amount of commerce is
covered. No more is required under the terms and purpose of Section 3.
Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 5, at 950 (see the economic tests proposed by the authors
at 919-31). Turner, supra note 5, at 59. The test is "whether competitors in fact have
ready access to adequate sources of supply and to a sufficient number of outlets to
enable their products to be effectively marketed." Report of the Attorney General's
Nat'l Comm. to Study the Antitrust Laws 147 (1955).
76 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra note 8.
20 Id. at 314.
21 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
22 Id. at 334. See Note, 2 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 442 (1961), and Handler,
Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 Yale L.J. 75 (1961).
23 In reviewing Tampa Electric, Handler wrote:
. . . [Title court went out of its way to make clear that neither absolute
quantitative substantiality (i.e., the dollar volume foreclosed), nor the com-
parative quantitative substantiality of Standard Stations (i.e., the market share
foreclosed) was to be the controlling doctrine, stating: "To determine substanti-
ality in a given case, it is necessary to weigh the probable effect of the contract on
the relevant area of effective competition, taking into account [I] the relative
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It thus appears that in the Jerald and Tampa Electric cases there are the
beginnings of erosion of the per se illegality rule. The extension of this
erosion can be seen in the principal case. However, this seems consistent
with the legislative history of section 3•24
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in the Dehydrating case,
while recognizing the principle that "a proper business reason," if shown
to exist, may be justification for an otherwise unlawful tie-in arrangement,
based its opinion in part upon another issue. This was a private suit for
treble damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, and it was incumbent
upon the plaintiff to establish damages in order that he might recover.
Due to the failure of the plaintiff to sustain the burden of proof, there
could be no recovery. As Judge Aldrich stated:
A consumer may well be damaged by antitrust violations requiring
him to make a purchase on terms that he does not wish . . .
but he has the burden of proving that he was wrongly affected.
This the plaintiff has failed to do. It has not shown that the
defendant charged an unreasonable price, or that an equivalent
product might have been obtained for less. Plaintiff's only damage
came from having to meet defendant's specifications with respect
to its storage containers. Since this has been demonstrated to be
reasonable, plaintiff has suffered no compensable loss.25
The court seemed to suggest that there may well be a difference in
required proof between a government suit to enforce Section 3 of the
Clayton Act and a private damage action as allowed by section 4.26 Once
a violation of section 3 has been shown, the plaintiff cannot merely rely
on the inference created that he has been damaged by the unlawful tie-in.
He must further prove his "special damages" in order to recover. Whether
or not the same result would have been reached in a suit by the government
was not decided.
Another question which the court felt it did not need to answer was
whether there was a compulsory joining of two "separate" articles which
would be a per se violation of the act. This issue was avoided by the
following language: "Articles though physically distinct, may be related
strength of the parties, [2] the proportionate volume of commerce in the relevant
market area, [3] and the probable immediate and future effects which pre-
emption of that share of the market might have on effective competition therein.
It follows that a mere showing that the contract itself involves a substantial
number of dollars is ordinarily of little consequence." [365 US. 320, 329 (1961)]
Handler, supra note 22, at 83.
24 In Tampa Electric, the Supreme Court returned to an interpretation of
Section 3 of the Clayton Act which is faithful both to its legislative history
and to the philosophy of antitrust.
Handler, supra note 22, at 81. This article contains an excellent review of the legislative
history of Section 3 of the Clayton Act.
25 supra note 1, at 657.
26 This is not a government suit testing the broad aspects of defendant's
conduct, but a private action in which the plaintiff seeks, and must establish,
its damages.
Ibid. See also Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 289 F.2d
86 (9th Cir. 1960.
322
CASE NOTES
through circumstances. The sound business interests of the seller or,
phrasing it another way, a substantial hardship apart from the loss of the
tie-in sale may be such a circumstance."27 It therefore seems that a showing
that either the two articles are physically inseparable28 or that a proper
business reason exists for the tying will relieve the defendant from liability
for the damages or violation of the statute at least for the period of time
for which justification may be shown to exist.
Whether the "proper business reason" test is desirable with respect to
enforcement of the antitrust laws, depends upon the objectives sought to be
accomplished. A strict per se rule limits the amount of evidence necessary
to prove violations29 and expedites trials. However, this approach would
necessarily require that situations similar to Jerald and Dehydrating fall
within the proscribed area of conduct. It has been suggested that such cases
would rarely be found3° and that the overall purpose served by the strict
test might outweigh the advantage gained by consideration of business
purposes.°' The opponents of this point of view feel that the public policy
consideration is of greater importance and favor evaluation of the economic
factors present in each situation arising under the act.32 It is arguable that
this is consistent with the legislative history of section 3. Of course even
this approach may take the per se rule as a starting point, but it extends the
rule by allowing the defendant to show that no substantial competitive
injury will result from the tying arrangement. If the defendant cannot
sustain the burden of proof the per se rule will still apply. The extreme
position would be that of allowing tie-ins to exist irrespective of any com-
petitive impact provided the defendant could show a "proper business
reason" to justify the otherwise unlawful conduct.33
The argument has been advanced that courts are not capable of dealing
with detailed economic investigation and that such procedures are highly
time consuming. It seems that this would be no more difficult than the
procedures currently followed in licensing and rate making proceedings.
The Federal Trade Commission, in policing the antitrust area has required
"evidence relating to the competitive effect of the exclusive dealing pro-
visions" in requirements contracts and has little difficulty in handling such
problems.34 Why should not the expertise of an administrative agency be
beneficial in dealing with the area of tying arrangements?
, In both Jerold and Dehydrating, had the determination of substantiality
been made in accordance with the test set out in the Tampa Electric
27 Supra note 1, at 655.
28 See Turner, supra note 5.
28 See Northern Pacific, supra note 10.
30 Turner, supra note 5, at 64.
37 . . . [W]e must ask whether there are other legitimate interests that are
served by the practice in question; (2) if so, whether those interests can or
cannot be served by less restrictive alternatives and (3) if they cannot, whether
the contribution made by the restrictive practice is likely to be outweighed by
the harm, over the range of situations in which it may be used.
Turner, supra note 5, at 59.
32 Supra notes 18, 23, 24.
33 Supra notes 1, 13.
34 Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485, 486 (1953).
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decision" and consideration been given to the "probable immediate and
future effects which pre-emption of the share of the market" would have
on competition, the same results could no doubt have been reached.
MICHAEL S. STERN
Trade Regulations—Trade Names—Nonnecessity of Proving Secondary
Meaning.—Lincoln Restaurant Corp. v. V7olfies Rest. Inc.'—Plaintiffs are
the proprietors of two well-known restaurants and sandwich shops both
called "Wolfies," in Miami Beach, Florida. Plaintiffs spend about $25,000
annually for advertising, mostly in the Miami area. Defendant,2 with
knowledge of plaintiff's prior use, opened a restaurant called "Wolfies" in
Brooklyn, N.Y. It was conceded that at least 5,000 Brooklynites visit
Miami Beach every year. After plaintiff initially objected to defendant's
use of the name, defendant added a legend—"not connected with any other
establishment"—to its menu.° Defendant's menu was otherwise similar
in color and format to that of plaintiff and featured such items as "Wolfie's
Floridian Style French Toast," "Wolfie's Floridian Style Fountain Cre-
ations," and "Wolfie's Floridian Style Sundae Delights."4 The District
Court enjoined defendant's use of the name, the plaintiff's having waived
all damages.5 The Court of Appeals affirmed. HELD: Defendant's use of
the name "Wolfies" for his Brooklyn restaurant, with intent to trade on
the reputation of plaintiff's restaurant of the same name in Miami, con-
stitutes unfair competition, even without a finding of secondary meaning.
As originally conceived, unfair competition was a "convenient name
for the doctrine that no one should be allowed to sell his goods as those
of another." Most all the definitions of unfair competition found in opinions
of the courts were written in terms of "passing off."7 "Traditionally, the
the action of 'passing off' or 'palming off' has required proof that a fraud
is being perpetrated, i.e., that the defendant is so foisting his product on
the market that there is resulting confusion or likelihood of confusion
as to its source in the mind of the buying public." The critical question
was whether the public was moved to buy the article because of its source.
The part played by secondary meaning° in proving public confusion
35 Supra note 23.
1 291 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1961).
2 As brought out at the trial, none of the defendant owners was named Wolf.
3 These words were written in red 1/16 inch letters at the bottom of the center or
inside of the menu. The trial court found that the legend did little to remedy the
existing similarity.
4 The defendants contended that this terminology was suggestive of "flowers"
rather than Florida.
5 185 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
6 Vogue Co. v. Thompson—Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509, 512 (6th Or. 1924).
7 1 Nims, Unfair Competition and Trademarks 4, at 30 (4th ed. 1947).
8 Speedry Products Inc. v. Dri Mark Products Inc., 271 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir.
1959).
9 Merriam v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912):
The secondary meaning theory .. . contemplates that a word or phrase origi-
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